Orderings and inference relations can be successfully used to model the behavior of a rational agent. This behavior is indeed represented either by a set of ordered pairs that reflect the agent's preferences, or by a rational inference relation that describes the agent's internal logics. In the finite case where we work, both structures admit a simple representation by means of logical chains. The problem of revising such inference processes arises when it appears necessary to modify the original model in order to take into account new facts about the agent's behavior. How is it then possible to perform the desired modification ? We study here the possibilities offered by the technique of 'chain revision' which appears to be the easiest way to treat this kind of problem: the revision is performed through a simple modification of the logical chain attached to the agent's behavior, and the revision problem boils down to adding, retracting or modifying some of the links of the original chain. This perspective permits an effective treatment of the problems of both simple and multiple revision. The technique developed can also be used in some limiting cases, when the agent's inference process is only partially known, encoded by an incomplete set of preferences or a conditional knowledge base.
Introduction
We showed recently (see [3, 4 and 5] ) that it was possible to study the behavior of an agent, expressed by a set of preferences or by an inference relation, through a certain auxiliary subset of the underlying propositional language L. When the behavior to be studied is of rational type, it can be very simply represented by means of a logical chain. This means that if is the strict partial order over L that represents the preferences of the agent and if ∼ is the rational inference relation that models the agent's reasoning, there exists a sequence of formulas δ 0 , δ 1 , ..., δ n , each δ i implying δ i+1 , such that the preference α β holds if and only if there exists a link δ i that is both consistent with α and inconsistent with β. Similarly the conditional α ∼ β holds if and only if there exits a δ i that is both consistent with α and inconsistent with α ∧ ¬β. The behavior of the agent is thus entirely determined by this subjacent logical chain.
This representation of inferences or preferences by means of logical chains reveals itself to be a particularly useful tool when one has to operate changes in the agent's behavior. It may indeed be the case that a given preference α β that does not model accurately enough the behavior of the agent has to be retracted from the set of preferences of this agent, or even that it has to be replaced by β α. When performing the desired modification, one has to be aware of all the implications this change may induce on the other preferences. To take a trivial example, the preference α β that has to be retracted may come as a result from α γ and γ β, so it will be necessary to either reverse one, at least, of these inequalities, or decide to retract both of them, a choice that may of course interfere with other preferences of the initial set. Translating in terms of preferences the results that were established, in [5] , in the framework of rational inference relations, we shall see that the right tool to handle this kind of problem is again provided by logical chains: the whole revision process boils down to a suitable action on the subjacent chain, and this framework leads to a solution that is by far the easiest to perform, as well as the most accurate when one wishes to respect some elementary principles of success and minimal change.
This 'standard' revision process finds its limits in two important domains. The first one occurs in the case of simultaneous revision, where a given rational inference relation has to be revised by an arbitrary set of conditionals. Iterated chain-revisions then are not sufficient. We shall see that in this case it is useful to treat the set of conditionals we want to revise with as a conditional base: taking its rational closure and working on the associated chain enables us eventually to find a fairly reasonable solution to the multiple revision problem.
The second limit to chain revision technique occurs when one only knows part of the agent's preferences or when the agent's behavior is modelled by a conditional base that only provides partial information on the agent's reasoning. Although it is always possible to perform the desired revision on some completion of this base, for instance on its rational closure, we have to take into account the relative significance of the conditional that is to be modified: if this conditional is itself part of the base, it has to be considered as more important than if it is only entailed by this base, in which case it only plays a secondary role. Chain representation is therefore not sufficient by itself to treat the problem of revising incomplete information. Nevertheless we shall see that in some particular cases (the revision of minimal bases by free conditionals) this technique applies successfully and leads to interesting solutions.
This paper therefore deals with several aspects of conditional revision. First, in the case where the agent's behavior is fully described by a complete set of preferences or a well-defined rational inference relation, we will recall and translate in our framework some previous results established in [4] and [5] showing how to revise this structure by a single preference or a single conditional. Next, supposing we only know part of the structure that encodes the agent's behavior, we will address the problem of performing a revision on an incomplete set of preferences or on a conditional base. Finally we will turn to the problem of multiple revision, that occurs when one has to revise a complete or incomplete structure by a set of several preferences or conditionals.
In order to make this paper self-contained, we will recall the basic facts concerning rational orders and rational inference relations. These two notions fundamentally cover the same ratione but they convey different perspectives, and this is the reason why we think it interesting to translate and interpret our results in both frameworks. We shall recall the construction proposed in [4] of the logical chain attached to a rational preference order, and we shall put in evidence the duality between preference orders and logical chains. This will enable us to handle correctly the problem of revising these orders: working through the associated chain, we will find a simple solution that happens to be an optimal one, in a sense that will be made precise. We shall compare our solution with another one that was proposed in [2] . Then we will briefly evoke the problem of sequentially revising a rational inference relation by several conditionals, before turning to that of simultaneous revision. This will drive us to the basic definitions relative to rational closure and to the construction of its associated logical chain. We shall introduce the new concept of a minimal conditional base, and that of a 'free' conditional. As we shall see, this will provide a solution both to the problems of conditional revision and to that of simultaneous revision.
The propositional calculus is particularly adequate when one has to deal with the notions of qualitative utility, preferences or beliefs. Although it is possible to work on the semantic level, translating preferences and inferences by order relations over worlds and logical chains by Lewis/Grove spheres, we will stay on the syntactic one: we indeed think this framework more suitable to interpret results concerning preferences and beliefs. Since we work in a finite language, these two levels are equivalent, and translation from one to the other is immediate.
Throughout this paper, we shall denote by L a propositional language built through the usual Boolean connectives on a finite number n of propositional variables p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n . Such an atom p i may be viewed as a belief, an alternative, or as the propensity of purchasing some given elementary item P i , the negation ¬p i reflecting in this case the reluctance of purchasing P i . A literal is a formula of the form p i or ¬p i . A conjunction of literals in all the n variables is called a complete formula. Any formula of L may be written as a disjunction of complete formulas, its disjunctive normal form. We denote respectively by and ⊥ the tautology true and the contradiction false. The classical consequence operator of L will be denoted by the symbol . Thus we read α β as "β logically follows from α", or "α implies β". We say that two formulas α and β are (classically) equivalent (written α ≡ β) if α implies β and β implies α. A formula α is said to be consistent if it does not imply ⊥, inconsistent if it implies ⊥. A formula α is consistent with the formula β if it does not imply ¬β. Since the language is supposed to be built on exactly n elementary propositions, we have either γ α or γ ¬α for any complete formula γ and any formula α. The central notion of this paper is that of preference. As this term is fairly vague and ambiguous, we must emphasize that in the present work we consider only those preferences that suppose the possible giving up of an item in favor of the preferred one: when we say that an agent prefers A to B, we mean that in the case the agent has to choose between A and B, not only would he take A but he would also reject B. Thus the relation of preference only holds between two items between which one does not really hesitate, as in the "Your money or your life" context. In this situation, it is indeed the case that giving one's money is preferred, in the above sense, to giving one's life (and similarly, keeping one's life is preferred to keeping one's money). On the other hand, we cannot say that one prefers tea with milk to tea, since it is meaningless to give up drinking tea in order to drink tea, be it with milk. Rather, we will say that one prefers tea with milk to tea without milk. To make this notion of preference more precise, we will suppose that it is expressed through a strict partial order defined on the language L (more precisely on the Lindenbaum algebra associated with this language). Thus a relation of the type α β is to be interpreted as "in the agent's mind, α is preferable to β": for this agent, the utility of the item proposed by α is greater than that of the item represented by β. It may be also helpful to keep in mind some other interpretations of the relation : thus in a different context, we may as well translate α β by "in the agent's mind the event α is more likely to happen than the event β", or, as it was first studied in [6] (but see also [8] ) "in the agent's mind, the belief that α is true is more entrenched than the belief that β is true".
The above considerations show that the preference relations we consider will satisfy some well-defined properties. Clearly, these relations are expected to be irreflexive, as one cannot give up an item A in order to get it. What is more important, they have to behave properly with respect to the consequence operation : indeed, if α is preferred to β, that is, if one is ready to give up β in order to get α, then any consequence of α must also be preferred to β. This because the choice of α implies at the same time the choice of all its consequences. In the "Your money or your life" example, this becomes particularly clear: any consequence of giving one's money is preferred to the loss of life. Again, although we do not deny their existence, we are not dealing here with preferences usually referred to in every-day life, when we have to choose say between two different models of cars: there, it may happen that model α is preferred overall to model β in spite of the fact that β has some qualities that α lacks. The relation between the consequence relation and the order may better be understood if we think of it as a way to compare beliefs or possibilities: if event A occurs more often than event B, then the same is true for any of its classical consequences. Similarly, if one's belief in α is more entrenched than his belief in β, then so is his belief in any consequence of α.
With this in mind, we can now proceed to the definition of a rational preference relation. For simplicity, we shall make use of the notation which will be defined as usual by β α iff one does not have α β. We will say that a binary relation over L is a relation of rational preference if it satisfies the five following properties The first rule states that anything is preferred to an inconsistent formula, even that formula itself. The second one expresses asymetry, (and hence irreflexivity) for consistent formulas: if α is preferred to β, then β cannot be preferred to α. This translates the fact that only strong preferences will be considered. Note that Pr 1 is equivalent to the property of connectedness of the relation : given two formulas α and β, one has either α β or β α.
The rule Pr 2 was already examined. It expresses the fact that one cannot prefer a formula α to a formula γ unless every single consequence of α is also preferred to γ. In a set-theoretic representation of objects of choice, its translation would be: if A ⊆ B and A C, then B C.
The rule Pr 3 may be illustrated by the fact that if, rather than a box containing an item B, an agent prefers to choose a box that may indifferently contain A or B, then it must be the case that this agent prefers A to B. In the context where compares the plausibility of two events, this rule means that if α ∨ β is more likely to happen than β, then α itself is more likely to happen than β. If compares the entrenchment of beliefs, this rule simply says that believing more in the truth of α ∨ β than in that of β implies that one believes more in the truth of α than in that of β. The translation of Pr 3 in set theory would be: if A ∪ B B, then A B.
Finally, the modularity rule Pr 4 expresses the natural fact that if γ is preferred to α while β is not preferred to α, then it must be the case that γ is preferred to β: if someone has a marked preference for bananas over oranges, but does not appreciate apples more than oranges, then he should prefer a banana to an apple. This rule is equivalent to the transitivity of the relation .
One readily sees that any relation satisfying the rules Pr 1 and Pr 4 is irreflexive and transitive over consistent formulae. A rational preference relation therefore induces a strict partial order on the set of all consistent formulas of L.
Let us illustrate this notion of rational orders by a simple example: let δ be any consistent formula of L, and consider the relation defined by: α β iff δ is consistent with α and inconsistent with β. Then it is easily checked that this relation satisfies properties Pr 0 to Pr 4 and is thus a rational preference order. It corresponds to the natural order induced on the power set of a set E by a subset of 'best' elements D, this order being defined by: A B iff A ∩ D = ∅ and B ∩ D = ∅: the subset A is preferred to the subset B iff some of the best elements of E are members of A whilst none of them is a member of B.
Let us quickly mention five derived rules satisfied by the restriction to consistent formulas of a rational preference :
α iff ¬α α.
β α whenever α β
The first rule expresses the fact that a formula α is preferred to a combination β ∨ γ if and only if α is preferred both to β and to γ. For the proof, note that if one has α β ∨ γ and, for instance, β α, then it follows from Pr 4 that β β ∨γ; this together with the fact that β β ∨γ contradicts Pr 2 . For the converse, suppose we have α β and α γ and β ∨ γ α.Then by Pr 4 we get β ∨ γ β and β ∨ γ γ, that is, using Pr 3 , γ β and β γ, contradicting Pr 1 .
Rule 2, which means that a disjunction β ∨ γ is preferred to a formula α iff one at least of the formulas β or γ is itself preferred to α, is a direct consequence of Pr 4 Rule 3 is immediate writing α = (α ∧ ¬β) ∨ (α ∧ β). Similarly, the fourth rule is a direct consequence of = α ∨ ¬α, and the last one is an immediate application of Pr 2 .
Rational preference orders and rational inference relations
Given a rational preference order , we may consider the inference relation ∼ on L defined by α ∼ β iff α ∧ β α ∧ ¬β. This inference relation can be interpreted by: α entails β iff α with β is preferred to α without β. We have then α ∼ β iff α α ∧¬β, showing that given α, we are ready to jump to the conclusion β iff we know that α alone happens more frequently than α together with ¬β. It is well-known (see for instance [6] ) that the relation ∼ thus defined is a rational consistent inference relation. This means it satisfies the properties:
Conversely, given a rational consistent inference relation ∼, one easily shows that the relation ∼ defined by α ∼ β iff α ∨ β ∼ ¬β is a rational preference order. This order may be interpreted as: α is preferred to β iff, given the alternative α or β, β is rejected.
It is not difficult to show that ∼ = , and that ∼ ∼ = ∼. Thus, in the finite case, rational orders and rational inference relations are exactly the same, and the translation of the results established in one domain easily translate into the other one via the formulas given above.
We shall indifferently use the notation ∼ or C in this context of rational inference relations: thus, we may write β ∈ C(α) for α ∼ β. By a convenient abuse of notation, we may also write α ∼β ∈ C for (α, β) ∈ ∼.
The ranking function associated with a rational preference
Given a rational preference on the language L, it is straightforward to check that the relation ∼ defined by: α ∼ β iff α β and β α is an equivalence relation. The set of equivalence classes [α] (α a consistent formula) is totally ordered through the relation defined by [α] [β] iff α β. The map that associates with every consistent formula its equivalence class provides a function κ from the set of consistent formulas onto a finite totally ordered set, and this set can be normalized to be the interval [0,
The function κ will be referred to as the utility function or the ranking function associated with the preference , and the integer κ(α) as the rank of α. As for the integer h, we will indifferently refer to it as the height of κ, or the height of . We have κ(α) κ(β) iff α β. Thus the formula α will be preferred to the formula β iff the utility of the item represented by α is greater than that of the item represented by β. If the associated rational inference relation ∼ is represented by its standard model, (W, <) we have m < n iff c(m) c(n) where c(m) and c(n) are the complete formulas associated with m and n. Note that one has κ(α)=κ(β) whenever α ≡ β. The utility of a disjunction is thus the greatest of the utility of its components. This important property in fact characterizes the class of utility functions that stem from rational preference orders: indeed, suppose given a function κ from the subset of consistent formulas of L onto [0, h-1] that satisfies κ(α ∨ β) = max(κ(α), κ(β)) and κ(α) = κ(β) whenever α and β are equivalent. Define the relation on L by: α β iff β = ⊥ or κ(α) >κ (β). Then one easily checks that is a rational preference relation and that its associated ranking function is equal to κ.
Lemma 1 For all consistent formulas α and β one has
This result together with the above lemma shows that there is a one to one mapping between the family of rational preferences and that of the integral functions κ that are defined on the Lindenbaum algebra of a propositional language and that satisfy the equality 
Rational preferences and logical chains
A logical chain ∆ is a sequence of non-equivalent formulas
In the sequel, we will always suppose that the last term of the chain is equal to . A chain ∆ of the above form, with δ h−1 = will be said of length or of height h. Such a chain gives rise to a function κ ∆ from L to [0, h-1] defined by :
where r(α) is the first index i such that δ i is consistent with α. Thus the formulas of highest rank h-1 are the formulas that are consistent with δ 0 , while the formulas of rank 0 are those that are inconsistent with all the links of the chain but the last one. One has readily κ ∆ (α ∨ β) = max(κ ∆ (α), κ ∆ (β)), so, as noticed above, κ ∆ is a ranking function. Its associated rational preference order ∆ is defined by
Equivalently, we have α ∆ β iff there exists a link that is consistent with α but not with β. We will say in this case that the chain ∆ induces or entails the preference α β. Similarly, the chain ∆ induces a consistent rational inference relation ∼ ∆ defined by α ∼ ∆ β iff there exists a link that is consistent with α and inconsistent with α ∧ ¬β, that is iff r(α) < r(α ∧ ¬β).
The main interest in introducing logical chains is that any rational preference is induced by such a chain. More precisely we have the following syntactic analogue of a result first established by Grove [7] in the framework of belief revision 
Proof :
Let κ be the normalized ranking function associated with the preference order, and h its height. For each integer i ∈ [0, h − 1] denote by δ i the disjunction of all the complete formulas of rank ≥ h − 1 − i. This yields a chain
of length h, with last term equal to . We have to prove that, for any consistent formula α, κ ∆ (α) = κ(α). Note first that for any index i ≥ κ(α), δ i is the disjunction of all the complete formulas that have rank ≥ κ(α).
Writing α as a disjunction of complete formulas, one sees that one at least of these formulas, say γ, must have rank equal to κ(α). We have therefore γ δ i . As we have readily γ α, it follows that γ α ∧ δ i , showing that α is consistent with δ i for any index i ≥ κ(α). Conversely, suppose that i < h − 1−κ(α). The formula δ i is then a disjunction of complete formulas of rank strictly greater than κ(α). If γ is such a formula, one has necessarily γ ¬α: otherwise we would have γ α, which by rule Pr 1 and Pr 2 contradicts γ α. This shows that α is inconsistent with δ i for all i < h − 1−κ(α). It follows that the first index i such that α is consistent with
It remains to prove that if two different chains ∆ and ∆ induce the same ranking, they are equal. Note, first, that these chains must have the same length h, as his length is equal to the height of the induced ranking. Next, by the definition of this ranking, we must have r(α) = r (α) for any formula α. Consider then the j-th links δ j and δ j . We cannot have r(¬δ j ) = j, as this would imply r (¬δ j ) = j, hence δ j consistent with ¬δ j . Therefore, we have δ j δ j . Similarly, one shows that δ j δ j , so that δ j and δ j are equivalent formulas.2
The above theorem shows that in a finite environment the preferences, or the behavior, of a rational agent are always determined by a subjacent logical chain. An more general property was established in [3] , showing an analogous result for preference orders that do not necessarily satisfy the property of modularity expressed by Pr 4 . Nevertheless, the condition that the given propositional language is finite is essential: as we showed there, there exists an example of a simple rational preferences of height 2 that cannot come from any logical chain.
We summarize in the following array the definitions of ∼, and ∆ in terms of each other. 
Revising a complete set of rational preferences 2.3.1 How to handle the problem of preferences revision
Classically, a revision problem occurs when, disposing of a set of formulas (a knowledge base) that is supposed to represent all the information at one's disposal, it appears necessary to modify this set in order to take into account a new piece of information. A revision operation then consists in retracting from or adding to this basis one or several formulas. The famous AGM postulates [1] have been the guiding line for a number of researchers in an attempt to find optimal solutions. We have to point out, though, that this problem of classical revision does not fall within the scope of the present work: even if the reader finds some formal analogy with the classical formalisme.g. similar terms and definitions -he should be aware that we are working now in a completely different perspective.
To our knowledge and contrarily to classical revision and up-dating, very few researchers have written on the problem of preference revising. Quite simply put, this problem may be defined as the following one: we suppose the behavior of a given agent is represented by the set of his rational preferences and we decide to modify this behavior; in this purpose, we have to withdraw, add, or replace one -or several -given preferences. In most cases, this can be done in several different ways and the problem is: on which grounds should we decide, and which method, if any, should we adopt ? For instance, in the preceding example
we saw we had p ¬q. If we come to learn that, after all, this relation is not part of the agent's preferences, or even that we have to replace it by the inverse one, ¬q p, how should we change our model ? Note that the following rankings, all inducing ¬q p, all 'naturally' derived from the initial one, seem equally possible:
Any of these three rankings induces the desired preference ¬q p, but all do it at some expense, inducing changes that do not seem to be necessary: for instance, in the first and the third one, we have ¬p ∧ ¬q ¬p ∧ q, while these formulas had initially same rank, and, in the second one, we get p∧¬q p∧q, reversing the original preference. As we shall see later, though, it is possible to make the desired modification keeping these two formulas at the same level. Thus, it is clear that none of the above modifications may be considered as an optimal one, as they all imply some unnecessary loss of the original information. We see that even in the simplest situation of a language with only two propositional variables the preference revision problem does not offer quite an obvious solution.
Things work differently if one addresses this problem in the perspective of logical chains: indeed, by what we saw in the preceding section, any rational preference may be represented by a well-determined chain. So the operation of transforming this preference order into another one boils down to a chaintransformation problem: given a logical chain ∆ that induces the preference α β, transform it in a reasonable fashion into a chain ∆ that will no longer induce α β, (or that will induce α β ). Of course, we have to be a bit more precise concerning this 'reasonable' fashion and examine more closely what properties we should expect from an ideal transformation. For this it will be useful to make a distinction between two different problems, that of the contraction of a rational preference set by a preference α β and that of its revision by this preference:
a) The contraction problem occurs when one wants to withdraw a particular preference α β from the given set of rational preferences, or when a particular conditional α ∼ β should be retracted from the rational inference relation ∼ that models the agent's behavior. This problem amounts to the following one: given a logical chain ∆ that entails α β, build a new chain ∆÷(α β) that no longer entails this particular preference or this particular conditional. b) We shall talk of the revision of a set of rational preferences by a preference α β when we deal with the problem of adding this particular preference to the given set. In other words, starting from a chain ∆ that does not entail α β, we are looking for a chain ∆ (α β) that entails this preference. Equivalently, we shall talk of the revision of a rational inference relation ∼ by a conditional α ∼ β.
Note that contracting or revising by a conditional α ∼ β is nothing else than contracting or revising by the preference α α ∧ ¬β, so that preference revision immediately translate into conditional revision.
Considering both operations of contraction and revision, there exists a few natural and elementary principles that we should observe. Naturally, we first expect success, in the sense that the contraction by α β should no longer entail this preference, while revision by α β should do so. But apart from this quite legitimate constraint, there is another principle we would like to conform to, that of minimal change, which requires to change as little as possible from the behavior of the agent, in as much as this behavior is represented by his set of preferences. More precisely we shall work with the following constraints:
Contracting by α β does not add any new preferences. 6) Contracting by α β eliminates only the preferences that necessarily imply α β. 7) Revising by α β eliminates only the preferences that are incompatible with α β. 8) Revising by α β doesn't add new preferences unnecessarily.
The four first constraints translate the principles of success and minimal change and are self-explanatory. The fifth one states that if one desires to withdraw a particular preference from the set of preferences of an agent, this should be done without adding any new preference. Indeed, the introduction of a new preference is supported by no justification and would be thus quite arbitrary. The sixth rule recalls that the aim of the contraction is to withdraw α β and nothing else when possible. If this is not possible, then only a minimal number preferences have to be withdrawn. Similarly the two last constraints define a principle of minimal change for revision: it may well be the case that a new preference cannot be added alone to the agent's preference set, and that it implies moreover to withdraw some of the initial preferences. But in both cases, the operation of revision should be performed in such a way that no unnecessary changes will be effected.
These principles being stated, it will be easy to apply them in cases of both contraction and revision, making simply use of the following Lemma 2 Let ∆ and ∆ be two logical chains, with induced preference orders
Proof : Suppose first that ∆ is a sub-chain of ∆ . If we have α ∆ β for two formulas α and β, this implies by definition that there exists a link of ∆ that is consistent with α and inconsistent with β. Since this link is also a member of the chain ∆ , we have immediately α ∆ β.
Conversely, let us show that ∆ ⊆ ∆ implies that ∆ is a sub-chain of ∆ .
Recall that, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the i-th link δ i of the chain ∆ is the disjunction of all complete formulas γ such that κ ∆ (γ) ≥ h − 1 − i, where h is the length of ∆. Let ζ be a complete formula with minimal κ ∆ rank among the complete formulas that have κ ∆ rank equal to h − 1 − i . The link δ i is then the disjunction of all the complete formulas
We claim that δ i is precisely equal to δ j , and is thus the j-th link of ∆ . By the choice of ζ, and the fact that ∆ ⊆ ∆ , we have indeed
and it follows that ζ ∆ γ and therefore, by our hypothesis, that ζ ∆ γ. This means that h − 1 − i ≤ κ ∆ (γ). We have therefore proven that, given a complete formula γ, one has
This shows that δ i = δ j , and the proof of the lemma is complete. 2
Chain contraction
We suppose now that the preferences of an agent are given by a logical chain
with last link equal to . We want to build a new chain ∆ = ∆ ÷ (α β) that does not induce α ∆ β. Taking into account the principles exposed in the precedent section, Lemma 2 suggests that the chain ∆ we are looking for should be a maximal sub-chain of ∆ that does not entail α β.
Denote by i = r(α) the first index such that δ i is consistent with α, and by j = r(β) the first index such that δ j is consistent with β. Recall that a chain Γ entails the preference α β iff r(α) < r(β). If j ≤ i, ∆ does not entail the preference α β, and we just set ∆ = ∆. If i < j, any sub-chain of ∆ that contains a link δ s with i ≤ s < j will still induce α β. We have therefore to remove from the chain ∆ all its links δ s such that r(α) ≤ s < r(β). It follows that the (unique) solution to the contraction problem is the chain:
It follows that the new ranking κ is given by
Clearly the contraction operation thus defined fully meets the constraints of success and of minimal change that were required for any 'reasonable' contraction operation. Translating this in the framework of consistent rational inference relations, we see that, if such an inference relation C is given by the chain ∆, the contraction of C by α ∼ β is the rational inference relation induced by the chain
with i = r(α) and k = r(α ∧ ¬β). 
Comparison with Boutilier-Goldszmidt work
In [2] , the authors proposed a "natural contraction operator " to solve the problem of conditional contraction by α ∼ β. Their method amounts to raising all the complete formulas that imply α ∧ ¬β to a new rank equal to that of α, leaving the other complete formulas unchanged. This, of course, operates the desired modification, but minimality is far from being reached, as it would be enough, for instance to raise only one of these complete formulas to κ(α). If we apply this method in the preceding example, we see that, after contraction of the ranking
by the conditional p ∨ ¬q ∼ q, we get by natural contraction the new ranking
Note, for instance, that in the process, the conditional p ∼ q is lost as well as the conditional ¬q ∼¬p, both conditionals induced by the original relation and both preserved in our process of chain contraction. The fact that unnecessary changes are effected by this "natural contraction" does not seem either to be compensated by any real intuitive advantage.
We now consider the well-known penguin example:
The propositional language is built on the three variables p ( penguins), f ( flying animal) and b ( bird). Let ∼be the rational inference relation given by the ranking
Suppose we want to eliminate from this relation the conditional ¬f ∼¬p, that says that something that does not fly is generally not a penguin. Using chain contraction, we get the chain ¬p ∨ b) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f )
and thus the ranking
Note that nothing can be derived from this revised relation concerning non-flying birds: they may or may not be penguins while, in the original relation, we had b∧¬f ∼ ¬p: non-flying birds were likely not to be penguins. If we use natural contraction, we find as modified ranking
and we see that, contrarily to what happened previously, we have b ∧ ¬f ∼ p: non-flying birds are likely to be penguins. A new conditional has been added, thus contradicting the fifth constraint.
Chain revision
Our problem now will be to add a given preference, say α β, to the set of rational preferences that reflects the behavior of an agent. Clearly, the procedure will differ, depending on whether or not this preference stands 'in contradiction' with the original set of preferences. The intuitive notion of contradiction can be made more precise: naturally, such a contradiction would result from the presence of β α among the given set of preferences of the agent, and there would also be a contradiction if the original set contained the preference α ¬β, since, by the first derived rule, this would lead to α . We would still have a contradiction if the set contained β α ∧ ¬β, for this latter inequality together with α β implies α ∨ β α ∨ β. As a matter of facts, it will turn out that only this latter case poses a problem. We shall therefore examine first the situation where the preference β α ∧ ¬β is not induced by the chain
that represents the agent's behavior.
In this simple case, the usual terminology is that of an expansion of ∆ by α β. Similarly to the notation used in classical revision theory, we shall denote by ∆ + (α β) the result of this chain expansion. As follows from the principle of minimal change and Lemma 2, ∆ + (α β) should be the smallest super-chain of ∆ that induces α β, if such a chain exists.
Let i = r(α). Since we supposed that ∆ does not induce the preference β α ∧ ¬β, we do not have β α, as results from the last derived rule. It follows that δ i−1 ¬β. Observe furthermore that δ i is consistent with α ∧ ¬β: otherwise we would have α α ∧ ¬β, hence β α ∧ ¬β as follows from the third and fifth derived rules.
Consider now the chain
obtained from ∆ by simply adding the link δ i ∧¬β). We claim that this chain fulfils all the requirements that were expected from the expansion of ∆ by α β:
• ∆ is a chain, as we have δ i−1 ¬β.
• ∆ induces α β because δ i ∧ ¬β is consistent with α but not with β.
• ∆ is a minimal extension of ∆ in the sense that:
-one has readily ∆ = ∆ if ∆ entailed α β.
-only one link was added to the original chain.
-any link δ such that ∆ ∪ {δ} entails α β must satisfy δ (δ i ∧ ¬β).
We shall refer to this chain as 'the' expansion of ∆ by α β and denote it by ∆ + (α β).
Let
Simply put, this amounts to separating in two the row of the complete formulas with rank κ(α): the formulas that implied β form a new rank, one notch downward. The other ones don't move.
Another way to evaluate this expansion is to compare the induced orders and = ∆+(α β) . One easily finds that for all complete formulas γ and δ, γ δ iff either γ δ or α γ δ α, γ ¬β and δ β. Let us now translate this result in the context of rational inference relations. We suppose as given a rational inference relation C, with associated chain ∆, which we want to expand by the conditional α ∼ β. Since this conditional corresponds to the preference α α ∧ ¬β, we see by what precedes that this expansion is possible iff one does not have α ∧ ¬β α ∧ β. As this latter preference corresponds to the conditional α ∼ ¬β, we conclude that the expansion by α ∼ β is possible iff α ∼ ¬β / ∈ C. When this is the case, the expanded relation is given by the chain
where i = r(α). This agrees with the "natural expansion" proposed by Boutilier-Goldszmidt in their paper. 
We finally turn to the more complicated case where the given chain ∆ induces the preference β α∧¬β. As we noticed, it is no longer possible just to make an expansion of ∆ by α β. The natural way to add this latter preference to our agent's scheme is thus first to retract the preference β α ∧ ¬β through our contraction procedure, and then to make an expansion by α β. Using the notations of classical revision theory, we shall denote by ∆ (α β) the resulting chain, that is ∆ (α β) = (∆ ÷ (β α ∧ ¬β) + (α β).
Set i = r(β) and j = r(α ∧ ¬β). The contraction by β α ∧ ¬β gives rise to the chain
The first link of this chain that is consistent with α is now δ j . Expanding by α β therefore provides the revised chain ∆ α β, which is equal to
The new rank κ = κ (α β) is given, for any complete formula γ by:
These results can be easily translated: the revision by α ∼ β of a rational inference relation C that entails α ∼ ¬β is readily seen to be given by the chain
where i = r(α) and j = r(α ∧ β). 
We note that that this relation entails the conditional
p ∧ b ∼ ¬f : in- deed the link (¬p ∨ b) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f ) is consistent with p ∧ b but not with p ∧ b ∧ f .¬p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧ ¬b ∧ f ¬p ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬f p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧ b ∧ ¬f p ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬f p ∧ ¬b ∧ f p ∧ b ∧ ¬f
Let us look at the result obtained through Boutilier-Goldszmidt method: to contract by
¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) ¬p ∨ (b ∧ f ) ¬p ∨ b .
Iterated and simultaneous revision of complete preference sets
Up till now, we have dealt with the problem of revising a complete set P of preferences in order to incorporate in it a single preference α β. The problem of iterated revision comes when, this having been done, it appears desirable to revise the new preference set by a second preference, say γ δ. This is quite naturally possible by revising, through the method set out above, the set P (α β) by γ δ. Thus, the solution simply amounts to taking the set (P (α β)) (γ δ) as resulting preference set. If the preference α β happens to disappear in the process, this is totally justified by the choice of the sequence in which we decide to make the revisions. Revising by γ δ only after the revision by α β has been performed is interpreted as: the requirement to get the preference γ δ follows that concerning the preference α β, and must therefore be considered as more important or more reliable than the latter. In this perspective, where former information or constraints may become obsolete, there is no contradiction nor harm in giving up a preference that contradicts the new one, even if the former was inserted in the initial preference set by means of a revision process.
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that one wishes to add both preferences α β and γ δ to the initial preference set. This of course could be done via the single revision by α ∧ γ β ∨ δ, as this preference implies both α β and γ δ, but this might be an excessive method -think for instance of the case where α ∧ γ is inconsistent.
To fix ideas a bit and show the type of problem we have to deal with, we consider the following situation
Cervantes puzzles
Cervantes decides he wants to compose a novel, the principal character of which will be Don Quixote de la Mancha. The author has not yet decided what the action will be, and he first tries to settle the portrait of his hero, his temper, his passions and goals. For this purpose, Cervantes starts from a flat model, not to have any pre-conceived ideas. To make things easy, in a first approach he considers that his hero will act determined by only three fundamental criteria: the preservation of life (l), the desire for wealth (w) and the quest for glory and adventure (g). Thus at the beginning, Cervantes displays on his white sheet, in a single row, the eight complete formulas corresponding to these items and considers this flat preference set, with its associated trivial chain δ 0 = .
Puzzle 1
Cervantes thinks of a character who, rather than wealth, would prize glory over all, being willing even to sacrifice his life in his quest for glory and adventure. It seems clear to the author that he should add the preferences ¬w ¬l and ¬l ¬g to Don Quixote's preference set. He therefore proceeds to a first expansion by ¬w ¬l, which yields the chain l . Now this chain induces the preference ¬g ¬l ∧ g, as ¬g is consistent with l while ¬l ∧ g is not. Therefore, the second desired revision by ¬l ¬g first requires a contraction by ¬g ¬l ∧ g; the final result provides the chain g , in which the author no longer finds the preference ¬w ¬l.
Fortunately, after a third revision of this latter chain by ¬w ¬l, a simple expansion in this case, finally leads to the chain g ∧ l g that entails both desired preferences ¬l ¬g and ¬w ¬l. Furthermore Cervantes notices that a double revision would have lead to the same result, simply beginning by ¬l ¬g instead of ¬w ¬l.
The first sketch of Don Quixote's preference set is then given by the rank-
Puzzle 2 Still willing to keep the preference ¬w ¬l in his hero's preference set, Cervantes now wishes to replace the preference ¬l ¬g by the simpler g l (Don Quixote prizes glory more than life). Starting again from the trivial chain which he expands by ¬w ¬l, the writer notes, though, that the expanded chain l induces the preference l g ∧ ¬l. To revise by ¬l ¬g, it is therefore necessary to make a contraction. The final result is the chain ¬l , which no longer entails ¬w ¬l. Remembering the preceding situation, Cervantes decides to invert the order and revise by g l before revising by ¬w ¬l. Alas, this does not work anymore: expansion by g l first leads to the chain ¬l , and subsequent revision by ¬w ¬l provides the chain l that no longer entails g l.
It seems that there is no way to force the two preferences ¬w ¬l and l g ∧ ¬l into Don Quixote's preference set... And indeed, after thinking this over, Cervantes notices that these two preferences cannot coexist in a single preference set as, together, they would imply l ∨ w ...
Puzzle 3
At this point, Cervantes realizes that he'd better start with a non trivial chain, and since he wants Don Quixote to adopt as motto 'Glory or Death', he decides that this chain will just be g ∨ ¬l . Realizing thereafter that the interest of his novel could gain a lot if he introduced, be it only in his hero's mind, a feminine character, he decides that the behavior of Don Quixote should also be much influenced by his relations with his Dulciana (d), and the desire to win her heart. To make things more manageable, the novelist puts aside for a while the part of Don Quixote's universe that has to do with wealth (w), leaving just him with the three fundamentals d, g and l. The initial ranking issued from the chain g ∨ ¬l thus becomes
Now, Don Quixote's subsequent behavior may be determined by two features: the first one is that, all things being otherwise equal, he prefers to stay alive ( ¬l); the second is that he prizes more his Dulciana than his quest for glory and adventure (d g), as these are only searched in order to win Dulciana's heart. These preference items should be therefore introduced in the set of Don Quixote's preferences. But the revision by ¬l, a simple expansion, leads to the chain g ∧ l g ∨ ¬l , and the subsequent revision by d g, which requires first a contraction by g d ∧ ¬g, finally leads to the chain ¬g ∧ ¬l g ∨ ¬l that no longer entails ¬l. Cervantes, in a first attempt to recover this preference proceeds to a third and, he hopes, a last revision by ¬l. But this first requires a contraction by ¬l l, and the result after revision by ¬l yields back the chain g ∧ l g ∨ ¬l . At this point, it is clear that it won't be possible to integrate both preferences ¬l and d g to the original chain g ∨ ¬l by a simple iteration of revisions... Does this come, wonders Cervantes, from the fact that, as in the preceding case, there exists a contradiction between these preferences ? After some unsuccessful attempts to detect it, he notices, though, that these preferences are both entailed by the chain ¬g ∧ l , a chain that he obviously can't get from the one he started unless he finds a new revision procedure. But then, he thinks, this would be at the cost of the principles of minimal change that seemed to him so natural...
Simultaneous revision reduced to iterated revision
The Cervantes puzzles illustrate the difficulties that may be encountered when we try to revise the set of preferences of an agent in order to get a new set that would contain two given preferences α β and γ δ. How can we approach these difficulties in general terms ?
We suppose that the initial preference set is induced by a chain
and our purpose is to determine whether it is possible to transform this chain by a succession of iterated revisions so that the resulting chain entails both preferences α β and α β . We may restrict ourselves to the case where ∆ entails α β because, anyway, this will be the case for the revised chain ∆ = ∆ (α β).
We set i = r(α) = r(α∧¬β), j = r(β), j = r(β ) and k = r(α ∧¬β ). Let us make the 'impossibility' hypothesis that no transformation of ∆ through successive revisions by α β and α β will induce at the same time these two preferences.
The chain ∆ then necessarily entails β α ∧ ¬β , otherwise revision by α β would be a simple expansion, preserving α β. We have therefore j < k and the revised chain ∆ (α β) is of the form
By our hypothesis, this chain no longer entails α β, and this implies readily that j ≤ i < j ≤ k. Moreover, this chain entails β α ∧ ¬β, since otherwise, making an expansion by α β would lead to a chain inducing both preferences. Since δ k is consistent with α, we must have δ k ∧ ¬β consistent with β, and δ k is thus the first link of the revised chain that is β consistent. Also, as we saw, this link must be inconsistent with α ∧ ¬β.
Revising then by α β yields the chain (∆ (α ∧ ¬β )) (α β)
Applying again our hypothesis concerning the impossibility to get at the same time our two preferences, we see that this chain does not entail α β but entails β α ∧ ¬β . Thus δ k ∧ ¬β must be inconsistent with α ∧ ¬β . As a last attempt to revise this chain by α ∧ ¬β leads back to the previous ∆ (α ∧ ¬β ), we see that our impossibility condition is equivalent to the conjunction of three conditions, namely j ≤ i < j ≤ k, δ k is consistent with β ∧ ¬β , and δ k inconsistent with α ∧ ¬β ∧ ¬β and with α ∧ ¬β ∧ ¬β . Translating all this in terms of preference ranking, we obtain the Theorem 2 Let P be a complete set of preferences, α β a preference of P and α β an arbitrary preference. Then it is possible to modify P through iterated revisions and obtain both α β and α β iff one at least of the following conditions is satisfied:
The above result therefore provides a criterion to test whether two given preferences may be together incorporated through iterated revisions into the preference set of an agent. If none of the three conditions stated in theorem 2 is satisfied, it is impossible to revise the original preference set and get both preferences together. It may be the case that these two new preferences are mutually exclusive, as happened in Cervantes puzzle 2, but, as we saw in puzzle 3, it may also be the case that the revision procedure we used is inadequate to treat the general problem of multiple revision. In its all generality, this problem amounts to the following one: once given the preference set P of an agent and a consistent set K of preferences, determine a procedure that would enable to build a new preference set P that includes K and would differ as little as possible from P. Note that, equivalently, this problem could also be viewed as that of a single revision of P by a preference α β with the constraint that a given subset K of P has to be preserved. It is doubtful whether a generalization of theorem 2 could provide practical results in the case where K has more than two or three elements. But, above all, it seems that this constraint problem (preserving a given preference base K) does not fall in the context of iterated revision, where the new preferences to be added or retracted are taken one by one in a sequence that is the essential part of the revision process, the last preference to be treated being supposed to be more reliable than the preceding ones. Thus the constraint problem requires a study of its own for which the results established in the preceding sections are of little help. A different approach will be proposed in the last section of this paper.
The revision of knowledge bases and incomplete preference sets
So far, the chain representation of rational inferences and preferences proved to be the right tool to use. It enabled us to solve without drawbacks or shortcomings the problem of revising rational relations and preference orders. However its domain is a priori limited to the cases where we dispose of a complete information on the state of the world: all our study was made supposing that, given two items, one knows whether one of them is or is not preferred to the other. The set of preferences of the agent was thus supposed to be a complete preference set: the rank of every formula is known so that, given α and β, one always knows if the conditional α ∼ β holds, that is if the agent is ready to jump from the premise α to the conclusion β. Clearly, the methods we proposed cannot apply as such to incomplete sets of preferences or arbitrary sets of conditionals: to begin with, this comes from the fact that, technically, these methods are based on a representation by logical chains of ranked orders that do not usually exist among arbitrary sets of preferences. But, above all, we have to be more precise when we speak of revising the information conveyed by a knowledge base. Indeed knowledge bases are mainly, if not only, studied in the perspective of default extension, that is in as much as they can be embedded into a complete set of information formalized, for instance, by a rational consistent inference relation. They are thus tightly linked, almost identified, with their extension and, in most studies, only considered as some raw material that eventually may contribute to the construction of rational inference relations. For this reason there exists some ambiguity in the meaning of discarding a conditional from a given knowledge base: when we decide for instance that some conditional that was part of our original base has to be retracted, does that just mean we are looking for a new base in which this conditional should not lie, or, more radically, that we want to build a base in the extension of which our conditional should no longer lie ? To take a trivial example, suppose that our original knowledge base consists of the three conditionals penguin are birds, birds fly and penguins fly, and that we learn afterwards that the last conditional is questionable, so that we have to contract by this conditional. We may perform our revision by simply discarding the conditional penguins fly from our knowledge base, and take as new base the set {p ∼ b, b ∼ f }. But then it turns out that the conditional p ∼ f still remains entailed by all the extensions, at least the reasonable extensions, of this revised base. This may not be a drawback if the contraction by p ∼ f was decided as a simple caution, on the ground for instance that we had doubts about the authenticity or the integrity of the message encoded by our source. But it will surely be a shortcoming if our decision of contracting was motivated by real doubts about the ability of penguins to fly, or because experienced ornithologists told us of their conviction that penguins don't fly. Then, the simple base-revision procedure is totally inefficient: on one hand we do not want the conditional p ∼ f to be entailed by any extension of our revised base, and on the other one we do not want either to give up the remaining information encoded by the two first conditionals. In this paper, we shall adopt the perspective of a "strong" revision, where we focus our attention on the default-extensions, rather than that of a "mild" revision that only deals with the knowledge bases. Thus, the contraction of a base by a conditional, should lead to a new base, the extension of which is required no longer to imply the given conditional. We speak of "the" extension of a conditional knowledge base because, for its simplicity, our framework will be that of rational closure, whose construction will be recalled in the next section. As a first approach, the problem seems to have an easy solution: to perform the contraction, by the conditional α ∼ β, of the conditional base K that has C for rational closure, simply perform the chain-contraction of C as defined in Section 2.3.2. Doing this, though, would violate the the so-called categorial matching principle (see [10] ), according to which the representation of a belief state after a belief change has taken place should be in the same format as its representation before the change. In other words, the revision of the conditional base K through its rational closure should provide as last item a (revised) conditional base, the rational closure of which should be equal to the revision C of C by α ∼ β. Now, how and on what grounds shall we choose, among the numerous bases of C the one that will deserve to be considered as the revision of K by α ∼ β ? Surely, we would be tempted to apply some general principles analogous to those that we established in the framework of conditional revision, but it turns out that this is generally not possible. To see this, suppose for instance we are in the simple case where we have a conditional knowledge base K with rational closure C , and a conditional α ∼ β that is a member of C but not of K . Let K be the base K ∪ {α ∼ β} and consider the problem of contracting K by α ∼ β. Then, on the one hand, by the success and minimal change principles, we should get as revised base the base K . On the other hand, the resulting closure C of this revised base should agree with the contraction of the rational closure C of K, and therefore not have α ∼ β as a member, which contradicts our choice of α ∼ β. Therefore it is hopeless to look for a revision process that would plainly respect at both the base and the extension levels the "natural" principles of success and minimal change.
There exists a particular domain, though, where base-revision may be performed through ordinary conditional revision: it is that of canonical bases. But before defining these bases and studying their properties, we first need to recall some basic facts concerning the rational closure of knowledge bases.
Conditional knowledge bases and their rational closure
A conditional base K is a set of pairs (α i , β i ), where each pair is to be read as: "if α i , then generally β i ". Such a pair is called a conditional assertion, or a conditional, and is usually written as
In the finite case where we are working, we can define the material counterpartK of K as the conjunction of the material counterpart of its elements. The classical problem of default extension is to determine and build a suitable rational inference relation C such that K ∈ C. Several solutions exist but, in the present paper, we will be only interested in the so called rational closure proposed by Lehmann-Magidor [8] : following their terminology, we will say that a formula α is exceptional for a set A of conditional assertions iff α is inconsistent with the material counterpartĀ of A. Similarly, we will say that a conditional α ∼ β is exceptional for A if its antecedent α is exceptional for A, that is ifĀ ¬α.
The rational closure C K of K was the first system to be proposed and seems to be an optimal compromise between adequacy and tractability. The reader may refer to the original paper of Lehmann and Magidor or to the equivalent system Z of Pearl [9] . We will briefly recall the construction of this rational closure: we define inductively the sets K i , by K 0 = K and, for all i, K i+1 as the set of all elements of K i that are exceptional for K i . The conditional base K is assumed to be consistent, insuring that the K i 's form a strictly decreasing sequence. We will refer to this sequence as to the LM-sequence. Its total length h is the height of K; we have thus K h−1 = ∅. For each index i, set δ i =K i . Then the rational closure C K of K is the rational inference relation that is represented by the chain (δ i ) of length h (see [3] theorem 24 for details). We shall say that K is a base for C K . It is not difficult to prove that K is a subset of C K , and that C K is the rational closure of K ∪ {α ∼ β} for any element α ∼ β of C K .
Remark 2
The duality between preference orders and rational inference relations can be easily transposed to incomplete ordering structures. If P is a set of pairs α i β i , we can define the rational closure of P as that of the
Note that the material counterpart of such a set is then equal to i ¬β i .
Remark 3 Let α ∼ β be an element of K and i such that
Then we see that i is the first index such that α is consistent with δ i . In other words, using our preceding notation, we have i = r(α). We will also denote this index i by r(α ∼ β). For any conditional α ∼ β of K, we have therefore r(α ∼ β) = r(α).
Example 7 ( penguins triangle)
Suppose K consists of the three conditionals p ∼ b, b ∼ f and p ∼ ¬f . We have then
Minimal bases
It is clear from the construction of the sequence (δ i ) that if the knowledge base K has n elements, the height of its rational closure C K is at most equal to n + 1. Given a rational inference relation C of height h, we shall say that K is a minimal base for C if it has for closure C and for cardinal h − 1. We shall say that a set K is a minimal base if its is a minimal base of its rational closure. Note that the penguins triangle base {p ∼ b, b ∼ f , p ∼ ¬f } is not minimal since its number of elements is equal to the height of its closure.
Let us first show that minimal bases always exist.
Theorem 3 Let C be a rational consistent inference relation, and
its associated chain. Then the set
is a minimal base for C.
Proof : Straightforward, computing the LM-sequence of B.2
We shall call the set B the canonical base of C. Thus we see that in the penguins triangle example, the base {p ∼ b, b ∼ f, p ∼ ¬f } with three elements can be replaced by the minimal one
} that has only two elements.
Minimal bases play an interesting role in the framework of conditional revision: deleting an element from a minimal base ensures that this element will not be entailed by its rational closure: Proof : If α ∼ β was an element of the closure of K , this closure would agree with the closure of K ∪ {α ∼ β} = K, and K would be therefore a base for C, contradicting the minimality of K.2
The above result shows that any deletion performed on a minimal base yields a contraction on its rational closure. Nevertheless, the property of being minimal is not preserved under set-theoretic contraction, and the principle of categorial matching does not apply to minimal bases because a subset of a minimal base need not be itself a minimal base. Consider for instance the set K = { ∼ p, ¬p ∨ ¬f ∼ f, ¬f ∼ ¬b}. Then one easily checks that its rational closure is represented by the chain p ∧ f f b ∨ f , so that K is a minimal base. Nevertheless the subset of two elements { ∼ p, ¬f ∼ ¬b} generates the relation represented by the chain of height 2 equal to p ∧ (¬b ∨ f )
. This subset is therefore no longer a minimal base.
The following provides an alternative definition of minimal bases: When these properties are satisfied, one has ¬α ∨ β = δ r(α ∼β) for every element α ∼ β of K.
Proof : If K is minimal, it has h−1 elements. The map that associates with every conditional α ∼ β ∈ K its pseudo-rank r(α ∼ β) is a surjection from K onto the set {0, 1, . . . , h − 2} and therefore a one-to-one mapping. From this follows that for any index i < h − 1, there exists exactly one conditional
An interesting property of minimal bases is that they can be used to make some surgery on other bases: 
Proof :
Let (K i ) and (K i ) be the LM-sequences of K and
Taking the material counterpart, we get
We have δ 0 δ j , and, by construction, δ j α ∼ β . It follows thatK 0 =K 0 = δ 0 . If j > 1, this latter equality implies that the set K 1 is obtained from K 1 by replacing α ∼ β by α ∼ β, and thatK 1 =K 1 = δ 1 . Similarly, we findK i =K i = δ i for all i ≤ j. Since we have readily K i = K i for i > j, we see that the chain induced by K is the chain (δ i ) as claimed. 2
The above result is no longer true if K is not minimal. For instance, in the penguins triangle example, replacing the conditional p ∼ b by the conditional of same rank p ∼ ¬f yields the base {b ∼ f, p ∼ ¬f } the associated chain of which, (¬b ∨ f ) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f )
, different from the original one. Note an immediate generalization of theorem 5 : iterating the process, we can choose an arbitrary number of elements of K that have different rank and replace them one by one by the element of corresponding rank that lies in K. The resulting set will be again a base for C.
Corollary 1 ( base completion)
Let C be a rational consistent inference relation, with associated chain We shall say that a set of conditionals {α 1 ∼ β 1 , α 2 ∼ β 2 , . . . , α n ∼ β n } is a free system in C (or more briefly that these conditionals are free) if this set is part of a minimal base for C.
The following result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a single conditional to be free:
Theorem 6 Let C be a rational consistent inference relation represented by the chain (δ i ) and α ∼ β an element of C. Then α ∼ β is free iff one has
Proof : Let j = r(α). By the above corollary, α ∼ β is part of a minimal base for C iff K is a base for C, where K is the set
Computing its associated LM-sequence and the corresponding material counterparts, we findK i = δ i for all i = j andK j = (¬α ∨ β) ∧ δ j+1 . We must have therefore δ j = (¬α ∨ β) ∧ δ j+1 as claimed. 
Canonical base revision
We can now return to the problem of revising an incomplete structure. As we mentioned, revising a conditional base by applying chain revision to its rational closure may lead to counterintuitive results and furthermore violates the principle of categorial matching. The chain-revision procedure is therefore of little use in the general context of base-revision problems. Even if we restrict our domain to that of minimal bases, there is no hope that we could perform a well-defined minimal base revision by just operating on its rational closure. First, this may again violate the categorial matching principle, since a subset of a minimal base is not necessarily minimal itself; but furthermore, even if the contracted base is minimal, there is no reason that its closure should agree with the contraction of the original closure. For instance, taking again the penguins triangle, we know that {b ∼ f, p ∼ b ∧ ¬f } and { ∼ ¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ), p ∼ b ∧ ¬f } have the same rational closure C, and that they are both minimal bases for C. Performing a chain contraction by p ∼ b ∧ ¬f cannot yield a relation that would be at the same time the closure of {b ∼ f } and that of { ∼ ¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f )}, since these bases have different closures. . . To ensure that shortcomings of this type won't occur, we will have to focus on some specific minimal bases.
Free conditional contraction
The technique of chain-revision can be applied when dealing with free conditionals and canonical bases. Let us first define the revision of a base K by a free conditional α ∼ β in the following way: We can now study the link between the operation of base contraction and that of chain contraction. 
Minimal base expansion and revision
In base contraction, the main difficulty was that retracting a conditional from a base did not guarantee that this conditional is retracted from its rational closure. Compared to this, base expansion poses no real problem: we are given a conditional base K with rational closure C and we want to incorporate in it a new conditional α ∼ β. Since a conditional base is always imbedded in its closure, the rational closure of K∪{α ∼ β} will entail α ∼ β, as desired, and the expanded base K ∪ {α ∼ β} therefore provides quite a simple solution. Several objections may nevertheless be raised against this elementary base expansion process. The first one concerns the link that may exist between the expansion of a base and the chain-expansion of its rational closure: when will they agree ? The second one poses the question of the respect of the categorial matching principle for minimal base: if the initial base was minimal, will the expanded base still be minimal ? Finally, another problem may be encountered in the case where the initial base remains unknown: all what we have at disposal is a rational consistent inference relation C, which we want to revise by a conditional α ∼ β: is it then possible to expand C in such a way that α ∼ β becomes part of a minimal base for this expansion ?
It is immediate that the chain-expansion of the closure of K does not generally agree with the closure of the expansion of K. For instance, suppose K consists of the single conditional ∼ δ; its closure is then represented by the chain δ . On one hand, supposing that δ is consistent with α, the chain-expansion by α ∼ β yields δ ∧ (¬α ∨ β) δ . On the other hand, excepted the limit case where δ ∧ (¬α ∨ β) is inconsistent with α, the closure of { ∼ δ, α ∼ β} is given by the chain δ ∧ (¬α ∨ β)
, which differs from the preceding one. Furthermore this simple example shows at the same time that expanding a minimal (and even a canonical) base (here, the singleton { ∼ δ}) by a conditional does not provide a minimal base: the height of the closure of { ∼ δ, α ∼ β} is equal to 2.
The easiest way to address the problems evoked above is, again, to work in the framework of canonical bases. We shall first build a copy of the canonical base that will contain an element close enough to the conditional that has to be added. More precisely, we define the expansion of K by α ∼ β as follows: Let us compute the LM-sequence of K + α ∼ β. For j < i, the j-th term of this sequence is the set
It follows that its material counterpart is equal to δ j . The i-th term of this sequence is {α ∼ β,
showing that α is not exceptional for this set. We conclude that the i+1-th term of the LM sequence is equal 
We have r(b ∧ ¬f ) = 1, and we see, after simplification, that the expansion of K by
which corresponds to the chain-expansion of the original chain by b∧¬f ∼ ¬p.
We finally turn to the case where we dispose of a base K that entails the conditional α ∼ ¬β and we want to build from K a new base that contains α ∼ β. To do so, we will first make a base-contraction in order to eliminate α ∼ ¬β and thereafter build the base-expansion by α ∼ β. Note that this requires that the conditional α ∼ ¬β is free for C, that is (theorem 6) that δ r(α) = (¬α ∨ ¬β) ∧ δ r(α)+1 . When this condition is satisfied, we simply define the base-revision of K by α ∼ β as the result of the contraction by α ∼ ¬β followed by the expansion by α ∼ β. Clearly the rational closure of this base agrees with the chain-revision of the rational closure of K. The revised base is minimal in this closure. It is equal to
Simultaneous revision
As we have seen, canonical bases play quite an important role in the theory of conditional bases. They can also be used in the research of a solution to the problem, evoked at the end of section 2.4.2, of simultaneous revision or revision with constraints. Let us recall that this problem is the following one: we are given a rational consistent inference relation C, and we would like to revise it by a set of conditionals K. Compared to the initial inference relation, that is supposed to model an agent's behavior, K represents some "new" and probably more reliable information. When trying to solve this problem, we noticed that even in the simple case where the set K has only two elements, iterated revision may reveal hazardous (see Cervantes puzzle 1) or totally inefficient (Cervantes puzzle 3). We shall propose now an alternative solution closely related to what we have seen in the framework of base-revision.
Our main hypothesis will be that the given set K may be treated as a consistent conditional base: we consider that, independently from C, the set K itself conveys partial but pertinent information about the agent's behavior. We therefore suppose that it admits a strictly decreasing LM-sequence, and hence a rational closure. In order to define the revision of C by K, we will consider that the information conveyed by this latter set is more reliable than the one initially given by C: in case of conflict, the base K will be preferred to the original rational inference relation C. This leads to the following To illustrate this definition, let us consider the simple case where K consists of a single conditional α ∼ β. Let (δ i ) i<h be the chain associated with C and set i = r(α) and j = r(α ∧ β). We suppose furthermore that we have i < j, that is α ∼ ¬β ∈ C. Set L = B C ∪ {α ∼ β} and L i the i-th term of its LM-sequence. We have then: Let us test this procedure of revision by conditional bases on the problems we met when trying to solve Cervantes puzzles (see 2.4.1).
In the first puzzle we have to revise the chain by the two preferences ¬l ¬g and ¬w ¬l. This amounts to a revision of the empty set by the conditional base K = {¬w ∨ ¬l ∼ l, ¬l ∨ ¬g ∼ g}. This yields the rational closure of K, which is represented by the chain l ∧ g g . This result agrees with the solution found after several iterated revisions.
We noticed that the second puzzle was an impossible one since the two preferences ¬w ¬l and l g ∧ ¬l could not coexist. Indeed, we see that the corresponding base K = {¬w ∨ ¬l ∼ l, l ∨ g ∼ l ∨ ¬g} is here inconsistent, as we have K = ⊥.
Let us finally turn to the last puzzle: the chain g ∨ ¬l with canonical base { ∼ g ∨ ¬l} has to be revised by the base { ∼ l, d ∨ g ∼ ¬g}. We have { ∼ g ∨ ¬l, ∼ l, d ∨ g ∼ ¬g} = ⊥, and we have therefore to take the rational closure of { ∼ l, d ∨ g ∼ ¬g} This leads to the chain l ∧ ¬g , a solution which, as we saw, cannot be obtained through iterated revisions from the original chain.
The main interest of this method is that it rests on a simple and natural idea. The set of conditionals to revise with is treated as partial information, which will be melt together with as much as possible of the original inference relation in order to form a new conditional base whose rational closure will finally provide the desired revision. As we saw from the Cervantes puzzles, it is not possible to perform simultaneous or multiple revision in such a way that both postulates of success and minimal change are satisfied. Clearly, in the method we propose here, the latter has been given up at the profit of the former, and the result is that, as expected, the conditional base K is always part of the revised set C K, ensuring that the success postulate is always satisfied.
It is worth pointing out that this same method may also apply to address the problem of simultaneous base revision. This problem occurs when, instead of a complete set of preferences or a rational inference relation, we only dispose of some partial information encoded by an original conditional base. In order to revise this base by the new and more reliable information that is provided, the base K, we simply proceed as follows: 
Conclusion
In this work, we considered the problem of revising a set of conditional assertions or of rational preferences that is supposed to encode the behavior of an agent. We first dealt with the case where the system at hand is a complete one, in which case it can be modelled by a rational preference order or by a rational inference relation. In the simple case where one has to revise this structure with a single preference or a single conditional, we saw that using the chain representation technique leads to a simple solution that fully respects the postulates of success and of minimal change. This technique cannot be directly applied to the case of multiple revision, or revision with constraints. Another solution was therefore proposed, in which the set that commands the revision was considered as a conditional base, to which one adds, via the rational closure process, 'as much as possible' of the original relation.
After having studied the revision of complete inference processes, we turned to the case where the information at hand was incomplete. Again, rational closure and its representation by chains could be successfully used to revise a rational base by a single conditional or by another rational base.
The tool provided by logical chains reveals itself quite a performing one in the study, be it static or dynamic, of the complete preference sets or the rational consistent inference relations that describe an agent's behavior in a finite environment. It may be cautiously carried over to certain classes of conditional bases, leading to a revision process for incomplete information or to multiple revision. We have to underline, though, that the solutions we presented in these latter cases have to be more precisely evaluated, and compared with other existing solutions, if any such solutions exist. Their advantages and drawbacks have to be carefully studied. In particular, the link between simple and multiple revision is not quite satisfactory : the technique of multiple revision applied to a single conditional should provide a solution identical to that given by simple chain-revision. In this perspective, this paper may be considered only as a first attempt to show that solutions to the multiple revision problem exist. It is to hope that these solutions will be improved in the next future.
